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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DUTY TO CORRECT ANOTHER’S MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATIONS: A CONTEXTUAL APPROACH FOR
ANALYZING FRAUDULENT BEHAVIOR UNDER RULE 10B-5
ABSTRACT
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act is the broadest antifraud provision within securities laws and is enforced through Rule 10b-5,
which makes it unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security, to defraud, misrepresent material facts, omit material facts, or
engage in any practice which operates as fraud or deceit upon any person. In
promulgating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Congress, and the SEC by way of
Congressional authority, designed these laws to encompass the infinite variety
of devices by which undue advantage could be taken of investors and
corporations. Another goal of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is the need to protect
the security market’s integrity from abuses by those with access to material
nonpublic information that would affect the price of a corporation’s securities
upon public disclosure.
Individuals are capable of finding creative ways to manipulate the market,
and in turn, courts must also be creative in holding those individuals
accountable for their fraudulent behavior. While the concept that an issuer has
a duty to correct their own statements has widespread judicial and academic
acceptance, when does an issuer have a duty to correct misleading statements
made by third parties, such as reporters and financial analysts? What about
statements made by coworkers or fellow executive officers? The diversity of
circuit opinions demonstrates that any given Rule 10b-5 claim is unique and
rarely allows for a single coherent answer. Thus, this Note proposes that the
Supreme Court should adopt a case-by-case, contextual approach for analyzing
Rule 10b-5 violations.

167

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

168

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:167

INTRODUCTION
Less than one month into 2021, in addition to the Covid-19 pandemic and
political turmoil, the financial markets experienced a societal shift when
GameStop Corp. quickly became the center of the financial world. 1 Internet
retail investors publicly joined together using Reddit, a popular online forum, in
an attempt to undermine a hedge fund that shorted this outdated brick-andmortar video game retailer’s stock. 2 GameStop’s stock price surged from less
than twenty dollars in early January to nearly $500 on January 28th for no
apparent reason beyond thousands of Reddit users’ efforts to force a “short
squeeze.” 3 Then, unexpectedly, the Robinhood Financial, LLC trading platform
brazenly restricted GameStop stock purchase orders, triggering public outcry
from politicians, celebrities, and government agencies. 4 Without the ability to
purchase additional shares of GameStop, the Reddit users could not continue
with the short squeeze. 5
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities and Exchange Act is the broadest antifraud provision within securities laws and is enforced through Rule 10b-5, which
makes it unlawful for any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security, to defraud, misrepresent material facts, omit material facts, or engage
in any practice which operates as fraud or deceit upon any person. 6 While the
concept that an issuer has a duty to correct their own statements has widespread
judicial and academic acceptance, when does an issuer have a duty to correct
misleading statements made by third parties, such as reporters and financial
analysts? What about statements made by coworkers or fellow executive
officers? How could the previously mentioned Reddit users be liable for
manipulating the market? 7
This Note discusses the circuit split in federal courts regarding the
correlation between fiduciary duty and primary liability for remaining silent and
failing to correct another’s misrepresentation in violation of Section 10(b) and
corresponding Rule 10b-5. The Second, Third, and Ninth Circuit each have
conflicting opinions on the matter.
Part I of this Note discusses the formation of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and the applicable provisions of Section 10(b). Part II
1. Joshua F. Bautz, What is the SEC Going to do About GameStop?, NYSBA (Feb. 4, 2021),
https://nysba.org/what-is-the-sec-going-to-do-about-gamestop/.
2. Id.
3. Id. A short squeeze occurs when a stock jumps sharply higher, forcing traders who had bet
that its price would fall to buy it to prevent greater losses. Short Squeeze,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/shortsqueeze.asp (last visited Feb. 20,
2021).
4. Bautz, supra note 1.
5. Short Squeeze, supra note 3.
6. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020).
7. Bautz, supra note 1.
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explains a detailed history of relevant Rule 10b-5 litigation, including Supreme
Court decisions and the current circuit split regarding primary liability for
material misrepresentations. Part III provides a critique of the circuit split,
recommends an appropriate standard for future Supreme Court decisions, and
discusses the potential impact such a standard could have on the SEC’s ability
to hold individuals accountable for fraud.
I. BACKGROUND
During the 1920s, confidence in business rose with the stock market,
prompting an unprecedented economic boom, but after Black Tuesday, 8
Congressional investigations revealed that the Great Depression stemmed in part
from a great betrayal of trust—having encouraged investor faith in the free
market, financiers and stock traders manipulated it to their own ends. 9 As the
government was concerned about continued fraudulent activity, 10 President
Roosevelt turned to politicians and academics to frame new legislation that
tempered ideology with practicality. 11 This resulted in the Securities Act of 1933
(“the Securities Act”), which aimed to help prevent securities fraud, stated that
investors must receive truthful financial data about public securities, and gave
the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) the power to block securities sales. 12
Passing this Act created new issues for progressive reformers and economic
conservatives to confront in administrative agencies, like the FTC, and in the
halls of Congress over the ultimate shape of the ongoing reform. 13 From the
tumult of politics emerged an elegant solution: the creation of the Securities and
Exchange Commission under the umbrella of the 1934 Securities and Exchange
Act (“the Exchange Act”). 14 This Act gave the SEC extensive power to regulate
8. On Black Tuesday, October 29, 1929, the stock market crashed, along with public
confidence as investors and banks lost billions of dollars in just one day. The stock market crash
caused nearly 5,000 banks to close and led to bankruptcies, rampant unemployment, wage cuts, and
homelessness, which triggered the Great Depression. SEC: Securities and Exchange Commission,
HIST. (Dec. 6, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/us-government/securitiesandexchangecom
mission#:~:text=Securities%20Exchange%20Act%20of%201934,the%20New%20York%20
Stock%20Exchange [hereinafter SEC History].
9. 431 Days: Joseph P. Kennedy and the Creation of the SEC, SEC HIST. SOC’Y,
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/kennedy/index.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2020)
[hereinafter 431 Days].
10. To help determine the cause of the Great Depression and prevent a future stock market
crash, the U.S. Senate Banking Committee held hearings in 1932, known as the Pecora hearings,
named for the committee’s lead counsel, Ferdinand Pecora. The hearings determined that numerous
financial institutions had misled investors, acted irresponsibly, and participated in widespread
insider trading. SEC History, supra note 8.
11. 431 Days, supra note 9.
12. SEC History, supra note 8.
13. 431 Days, supra note 9.
14. Id.
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the securities industry and allowed the agency to bring civil charges against
individuals and companies that violated securities laws. 15
A.

The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934

The SEC was created in 1934 as an independent federal regulatory agency
tasked with protecting investors and capital, overseeing the stock market, and
proposing and enforcing federal securities laws. 16 Prior to the SEC’s creation,
oversight of trade in stocks, bonds, and other securities was virtually
nonexistent, which led to widespread fraud, insider trading, and other abuses. 17
Joseph Kennedy, one of the SEC’s first Commissioners and the first
Chairperson, declared the SEC a partner of honest capital that would help all
businesses by establishing new checks and setting up positive standards. 18 But
to recover from the Great Depression, the SEC faced a tougher job of
encouraging capital since the crash had driven investors out of the market, and
many believed that tough FTC registration rules helped keep them out. 19
Essentially, the American people needed a reboot of confidence in the market
and business.
The SEC attempted to restore market integrity through registration and
disclosure regimes for corporations selling securities. The corporate registration
process envisioned by the Exchange Act requires companies to provide essential
information that enables investors to make informed judgments about whether
to purchase a company’s securities, which in turn minimizes the burden and
expense of complying with the law. 20 Further, the SEC began requiring periodic
reporting of information by companies with publicly traded securities. 21 For
example, the Form 10-K annual report provides a comprehensive overview of a
company’s business and financial condition and includes audited financial
statements, and the Form 8-K is a “current report” that companies must file with
the SEC to keep shareholders informed of major events. 22 Independently, many
public companies also often schedule conference calls to discuss their earnings
or share other information with investors and stock exchanges.
In addition to, and in support of, the SEC’s disclosure and reporting
requirements, securities laws broadly prohibit fraudulent activities of any kind

15. SEC History, supra note 8.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 431 Days, supra note 9.
19. Id.
20. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, THE LAWS THAT GOVERN THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY,
https://www.sec.gov/answers/about-lawsshtml.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2020).
21. Id.
22. Form 10-K, INVESTOR.GOV, https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investingbasics/glossary/form-10-k (last visited Dec. 12, 2020).
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in connection with the sale of securities through Section 10(b) of the Exchange
Act and SEC Rule 10b-5.
B.

Section 10(b)’s Applicability & Provisions

Within the Exchange Act, Section 10(b) makes it unlawful for any person,
directly or indirectly, to use or employ any manipulative or deceptive device in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 23 The SEC intended Section
10(b) to act as a “catch-all” clause to prevent fraudulent practices within the
securities markets. 24 Section 10(b) is enforced through Rule 10b-5 which makes
it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud;
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or (c) to engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person. 25
These general antifraud provisions appear reasonably straightforward: “tell
the truth and don’t leave out any important information.” 26 However, courts,
scholars, securities issuers, and market participants continuously examine
whether these provisions are violated by telling half-truths, lying, or saying
nothing at all. 27 This area of securities law is muddled by two duties that arise
under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: the duty to correct and the duty to update. 28
An issuer has a duty to correct a statement that it discovers was misleading when
made, and an issuer has a duty to update a statement that was accurate when
made but later became misleading. 29
A fiduciary duty is a special type of relationship between parties who are
vulnerable to each other; it requires one party to act in the interest of the other
and not for their own benefit. 30 For example, directors of corporations are
charged with certain fiduciary duties for fulfilling their managerial
responsibilities, primarily the duty of care which requires that directors inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material information
23. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2018).
24. Elizabeth A. Odian, SEC v. Dorozhko’s Affirmative Misrepresentation Theory of Insider
Trading: An Improper Means to A Proper End, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1313, 1319 (2011).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1951).
26. Robert H. Rosenblum, An Issuer’s Duty Under 10b-5 to Correct and Update Materially
Misleading Statements, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 289, 289 (1991).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. An issuer is a legal entity that develops, registers, and sells securities to finance its
operations.
30. Fiduciary Duty, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty (last
visited Feb. 17, 2021).
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reasonably available to them. 31 In abiding by their duty of loyalty, corporate
officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and
confidence to further their private interest, or in other words, must act without
personal economic conflict. 32
Corporate insiders and individuals with access to inside information clearly
have affirmative duties to disclose or abstain from trading on the information,
and failure to comply with these duties can result in prosecutions under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for fraud and insider trading by the SEC or Department of
Justice. 33 Some courts have extended liability where there is a material omission
if the parties to the transaction have a fiduciary relationship—which seems
counterintuitive because ordinarily a failure to act does not trigger liability in the
common law regime. 34 However, when an individual remains silent while
another individual misrepresents material information, there is considerable
confusion over an individual’s duty to correct another’s misstatement. 35
Eighty years after the Exchange Act was enacted, the scope of liability under
Section 10(b) continues to evolve with Supreme Court and lower court
decisions. 36 This Note focuses on when an individual can say nothing at all, 37 or
avoid their duty to correct, based on their fiduciary relationship, or lack thereof,
to the issuer of securities and/or to those who would value the information.
II. RULE 10B-5 LITIGATION
At its heart, federal securities law and regulation are about disclosure, and
thus, the central question in most litigation is whether someone had a duty to
disclose information. 38 The hardest duty questions have been addressed under
the rubric of fraud, with Rule 10b-5 being the principal antifraud provision
31. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985), overruled by Gantler v. Stephens,
965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
32. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
33. Damian P. Gallagher, Duties, Disclosure, and Discord: Necessity to Resolve Circuit Split
and Certainty Leidos Could Have Clarified for Litigation Strategy and Risk Allocation, 11 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 255, 258 (2019).
34. Id.
35. Materiality is a factual question that refers to whether a piece of information would likely
be important to the reasonable investor, and by contrast, duty is usually a question of law that refers
to whether there is an obligation to disclose a certain category of information. Donald C.
Langevoort & G. Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule 10b-5, 57 VAND. L. R.
1639, 1640, 1644 (2019) [hereinafter Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty].
36. Section 10(b) Litigation: The Current Landscape, AM. BAR ASS’N (Oct. 20, 2014),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2014/10/03_kasner/#:~:text
=Section%2010(b)%20makes%20it,%C2%A7%2078j(b).
37. Sometimes referred to as omissions liability because a defendant’s failure to correct a
misleading statement in violation of Rule 10b-5 constitutes an “omission” of material information.
Id.
38. Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1640.
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within securities law. 39 To establish a case under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
there must be a deceptive device in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities. 40 Plaintiffs bring claims under this general prohibition arguing two
theories of fraud: nondisclosure or material misrepresentation. 41
Nondisclosure cases are traditionally referred to as insider trading. Insider
trading involves the nondisclosure of material nonpublic information gained
through the investor’s relationship to the issuing company, its shareholders, or
the source of nonpublic information. 42 The “deceptive device” requirement is
the trader’s breach of that fiduciary relationship. 43 The fiduciary duty
requirement reflects the principles that mere possession of nonpublic
information does not trigger a duty of disclosure, and federal securities laws
target the inappropriate and deceptive use of special relationships. 44
Material misrepresentation cases fall into a general category of securities
fraud that prohibit all fraud in connection with securities trades. 45 The
misrepresentation is made by the defendant to induce someone else to enter into
a securities transaction, rather than to inform their own securities matter. 46 Here,
the “deceptive device” requirement is the material misrepresentation of fact
rather than a breach of fiduciary duty. 47 Thus, a misrepresentation action under
Rule 10b-5 requires (1) a false representation or misleading omission to occur
for there to be a possibility of liability, and (2) the defendant have an affirmative

39. Id.
40. In re Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n Sec., 503 F. Supp. 2d 25, 32 (D.D.C. 2007). Complaints
brought under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are governed by special pleading standards adopted
by Congress in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PRSLA”). Id. at 36. Congress
enacted two heightened pleading requirements in the PSLRA: (1) the statute requires the plaintiff’s
complaint to specify each misleading statement or omission and specify why the statement or
omission was misleading; and (2) Congress stated in the PSLRA that a plaintiff’s complaint must
state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind. Id. at 36. Similarly, Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has
long required that “[i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or
mistake shall be stated with particularity.” Id. at 36–37. The text of the PSLRA was designed “to
embody in the Act itself at least the standards of Rule 9(b).” Id. at 37.
41. Odian, supra note 24, at 1332.
42. Id. Information is ‘material’ if a reasonable investor would view the information as
important to make an investment decision. H. Tomas Gomez-Arostegui, Note, A Comparative
Fault Framework for Rule 10b-5 Direct Misrepresentation Actions, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407, 1417
(1997).
43. Odian, supra note 24, at 1332.
44. Id. By contrast, for example, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not forbid trades where an
investor receives nonpublic information through permissible channels and without an obligation to
keep the information confidential or where the investor discloses the information to his fiduciary
prior to trading. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1332–33.
47. Id.
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duty to disclose the nonpublic material information. 48 Whether a misstatement
or misleading omission has occurred is typically a question of fact. 49
The elements of a Rule 10b-5 cause of action are: (1) a false and misleading
statement or omission of material fact; (2) scienter; (3) reliance; 50 and (4)
damages. 51 However, materiality, scienter, reliance, and causation are additional
elements, currently separate and distinct from the question of duty. 52
A.

The Supreme Court Discusses the Fiduciary Duty Element

Under the traditional reading, a claim for fraudulent non-disclosure arises
from a fiduciary’s failure to disclose material information to a principal with
whom the fiduciary is engaged in a transaction. 53 The Supreme Court assessed
the legislative intent behind Section 10(b) and determined that claims of fraud
and fiduciary breach may form a cause of action under Rule 10b-5 only if the
conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as “manipulative or deceptive” within the
meaning of the statute. 54 In Santa Fe Industries Co. v. Green, the Court held that
Rule 10b-5 required something more than just a garden-variety state fiduciary
duty claim. 55 In Santa Fe, the minority shareholder plaintiffs objected to a
merger price on the ground that it undervalued the corporation’s assets and
brought suit in federal court claiming that this low valuation of their shares was
fraud actionable under Rule 10b-5. 56 The minority shareholder’s claim failed
because there was no affirmative misrepresentation or fraudulent non-disclosure
as the information that the majority shareholders used to establish the merger
48. “An omission is the failure to state a fact necessary to make other statements not
misleading.” These affirmative misrepresentations can manifest themselves in the form of oral,
written, or electronic representations. Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 42, at 1414.
49. Id. Optimistic, soft, or “puffing” statements made by a company are generally inactionable. Heather Elayne Davis, Rule 10b-5 and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995: Ninth Circuit Law, ORANGE COUNTY LAW, 26, 31 (1999). Vague and amorphous statements
are also not actionable because reasonable investors do not consider ‘soft’ statements or loose
predictions important in making investment decisions. Id. “General statements of optimism may be
actionable in limited circumstances. A projection or statement of belief contains at least three
implicit factual assertions: (1) that the statement is genuinely believed; (2) that there is a
reasonable basis for that belief; and (3) that the speaker is not aware of any undisclosed facts
tending to seriously undermine the accuracy of the statement. A projection or statement of belief
may be actionable to the extent that one of these implied factual assertions is inaccurate.” Id. at 36–
37.
50. To succeed on a claim under Rule 10b-5 for a direct affirmative misrepresentation, as
opposed to an omission, the plaintiff must also demonstrate that they actually and justifiably relied
on the misstatement. Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 42, at 1417.
51. Paracor Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996).
52. Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1681.
53. Zachary J. Gubler, Insider Trading as Fraud, 98 N.C. L. REV. 533, 543–44 (2020).
54. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977).
55. Id. at 479.
56. Id. at 466–67.
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price was the same that the shareholders relied on to demonstrate that the merger
price was too low. 57 Since the minority shareholders could either accept or reject
the price offered for their shares, the transaction was neither deceptive or
manipulative in violation of Rule 10b-5. 58 The Court held that instances of
corporate mismanagement resulting in unfair treatment of shareholders by a
fiduciary are not within the statute or rule, and without more, there could be no
liability under Rule 10b-5. 59
In 1976, the Supreme Court held, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, that a
plaintiff claiming a Rule 10b-5 violation must prove that the defendant acted
with scienter, or the “intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” 60 While the
holding seems broad, the majority of lower courts subsequently read the decision
to hold merely that negligent misrepresentations were not actionable under
Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. 61 According to the Court, the phrases
“manipulative or deceptive” in Section 10(b) suggested that Congress intended
to merely forbid intentional or knowing conduct. 62 Thus, the Court expressly
approved Rule 10b-5 liability in cases where the defendant had actual
knowledge that the matters represented were false, but recommended a
subjective standard for measuring whether a misrepresentation is intentional,
willful, or knowing. 63 In other words, the Court reasoned that merely proving an
average reasonable person would have harbored the intent or knowledge is
legally insufficient, only evidence which directly refers to the defendant’s state
of mind is relevant. 64
In Chiarella v. United States, the Supreme Court endorsed a theory of
primary liability for insider trading consistent with the statute’s focus on fraud
as set forth in Santa Fe. 65 The Court held that silence in connection with the sale
of securities may operate as fraud actionable under Section 10(b) despite the
absence of statutory language or legislative history specifically addressing the
legality of nondisclosure, but such liability is premised upon a duty to disclose
arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between parties to a
transaction. 66 This classical theory of fraud only applied to corporate insiders
and failed to reach cases where a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic

57. Id. at 468. The majority shareholders in the transaction accurately disclosed all the
information they used to value the target firm’s assets prior to the merger vote. Id. at 474.
58. Id. at 474.
59. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479–80 (1977).
60. 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976).
61. Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 42, at 1423.
62. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 197.
63. Id. at 199.
64. Id. at 200.
65. Gubler, supra note 53, at 544.
66. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980). This is known as the traditional or
classic theory of insider trading.
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information in the stock of a corporation with which the trader has no fiduciary
relationship. 67
In his dissenting opinion of Chiarella, Chief Justice Burger proposed a
broader reading of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that would extend liability to
any person who misappropriated nonpublic information using any “deceptive
device.” 68 Burger argued that liability should attach when a person obtains an
informational advantage “not by superior experience, foresight, or industry, but
by some unlawful means” because silence is generally permitted during business
transactions unless the parties have a fiduciary relationship. 69 Building on this
principle, he advocated holding all persons to the same standard as insiders,
requiring any person who misappropriated material nonpublic information to
disclose or abstain from trading on it altogether. 70
However, the Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan articulated a new
ground for primary liability that would reach corporate “outsiders.” 71 In
O’Hagan, the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney was representing a company called
Grand Met in a tender offer for Pillsbury, a transaction that, once announced
publicly, would cause the price of Pillsbury stock to increase significantly. 72
James O’Hagan, a partner at the firm, obtained information by virtue of his
relationship with his law firm and purchased a substantial amount of Pillsbury
stock that netted him millions of dollars in profit, which he then used to conceal
prior embezzlements. 73 The Court found O’Hagan liable, holding that a person
who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential information
misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the information’s source, is
liable for violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 74
The O’Hagan Court had to come to terms with the statutory requirement
that the fraud be “in connection with” the sale of a security, and thus a new
guideline regarding Rule 10b-5 and fiduciary duty arose: fraud is not
consummated when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when
67. Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1659.
68. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240. The misappropriation theory of insider trading makes it illegal
to trade securities based on misappropriated, nonpublic information. However, Justices Blackmun
and Marshall noted in their dissent that stealing information from an employer was fraudulent
within the meaning of Section 10(b) because the statute was designed as a “catchall” provision to
protect investors from unknown risks, and the majority opinion’s confinement of the meaning of
fraud “by imposition of a requirement of a ‘special relationship’ akin to fiduciary duty before the
statute gives rise to a duty to disclose or to abstain from trading upon material, nonpublic
information.” Id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240.
70. Id.
71. 521 U.S. 642, 653 (1997).
72. Id. at 647–48.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 647. O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his actions to Grand Met and Dorsey & Whitney
was deceptive because he had a duty to of nondisclosure to his employer. Id. at 660.
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they use the information to purchase or sell securities without disclosure to their
principal. 75 Had O’Hagan used the nonpublic information for purposes unrelated
to a securities transaction, he would not be subject to Rule 10b-5 because the
rule does not capture all forms of fraud involving nonpublic information. 76 The
Court reasoned that O’Hagan’s conduct was “in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security” because O’Hagan completed the fraud when he used the
information to purchase and sell Pillsbury stock without disclosure to his law
firm—not when he received the confidential information. 77
The Supreme Court has also addressed whether there is Rule 10b-5 liability
when the trader has neither a fiduciary nor contractual relationship with the
source of the information but innocently obtains information and uses it to trade.
In Dirks v. SEC, Dirks received notice from a former officer at Equity Funding
of America that the company grossly overstated its assets by engaging in
fraudulent practices. 78 Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded in the
insurance company’s securities, but Dirks disclosed this information to a number
of clients and investors who did in fact own Equity Funding securities, and in
turn elected to sell their share of the company, avoiding huge losses incurred by
uninformed shareholders as news of the fraud became public. 79 The SEC
charged Dirks for insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,
but, adhering to its decision in Chiarella, the Court held that one’s duty to
disclose material nonpublic information prior to trading arises not from
possessing the information, but rather from the relationship between the
parties. 80 Therefore, despite aiding and abetting investors by tipping them off
about the fraud allegations, Dirks was not liable under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 because he owed no duty to Equity Funding or its shareholders. 81
Finally, and most recently, in a 6–2 decision, the Supreme Court laid out a
bright-line rule in which those who disseminate false statements with the intent
to defraud are primarily liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 even if they
are also secondarily liable under Rule 10b-5. 82 In Lorenzo v. SEC, the Court held
that an investment banker could be liable for securities fraud under Rule 10b-5
for disseminating two emails that contained false statements, even though the
emails were drafted and sent on behalf of his boss, and he merely “cut and
pasted” the contents into an email. 83 In doing so, the Court partially resolved a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
(2011).

Id. at 655–56.
Id. at 656.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 659, 661 (1997).
463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983).
Id. at 649, 670.
Id. at 654–55.
Id. at 667.
Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1104 (2019).
Id. at 1099; but see Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 141
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split among the circuits over Rule 10b-5(b)’s prohibition against “mak[ing] any
untrue statement,” which applies only to “makers” of false statements or those
with “ultimate authority” over the false statement’s contents. 84 Francis Lorenzo,
the director of investment banking at an SEC-registered brokerage firm, sent two
emails to prospective investors that described a potential investment in a
company with confirmed assets of $10 million supplied and approved by his
boss, but in reality Lorenzo knew that the company had much less in total
assets. 85
According to the Court, by sending emails he undisputedly understood to
contain material and false statements, Lorenzo employed a device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud and engaged in an act, practice, or course of business that
operated as a fraud. 86 Lorenzo argued that his conduct instead fell under the
aiding and abetting provisions of the securities laws, which provides secondary
liability for those who knowingly or recklessly provide substantial assistance to
another person who violates Rule 10b-5, and imposing primary liability upon
his conduct would “erase or at least weaken” the distinction between primary
and secondary liability. 87 The Court rejected this argument and expressed
concern that under an alternative reading of Rule 10b-5, the “plainly fraudulent”
behavior exhibited by Lorenzo might fall outside the scope of the rule. 88 If Rule
10b-5(b) were the exclusive regulator of conduct involving false or misleading
statements, and only “makers” of such statements could be held liable, then those
who disseminate false statements with the intent to cheat investors might escape
liability under the Rule altogether—Congress could not have intended such a
result. 89
Significantly, the Supreme Court cases that address when a duty to disclose
material information arises under Rule 10b-5 stress that the rule does not itself
impose a general affirmative duty to disclose material information, and instead
present a circular framework for the Circuits to apply: an individual has an
affirmative duty to disclose material information only if they have a fiduciary or
similar relationship that gives rise to an affirmative duty to disclose the omitted
information, and if the failure to disclose that information would be fraudulent. 90

84. Brian D. Koosed et al., Supreme Court Wages into Circuit Split, Endorses Broaded View
of “Scheme Liability” for Disseminating False Statements, K&L GATES (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.klgates.com/Supreme-Court-Wades-Into-Circuit-Split-Endorses-Broader-View-of04-04-2019.
85. Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1099 (2019).
86. Id. at 1101.
87. Id. at 1101, 1103.
88. Id. at 1102.
89. Id. at 1102–1103. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch warned in dissent that the Court’s opinion
could mean “virtually any person who assists with the making of a fraudulent misstatement will be
primarily liable and thereby subject not only to SEC enforcement, but private lawsuits.” Id. at 1109.
90. Rosenblum, supra note 26, at 293.
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Nonetheless, the framework suggests three issues to determine when a duty to
disclose arises: (1) when does a fiduciary relationship exist; (2) under what
circumstances does that relationship give rise to an affirmative disclosure duty;
and (3) when is a breach of that duty fraudulent for purposes of Rule 10b-5? 91
B.

The Circuit Split

Unsurprisingly, the Circuits each set different standards for determining the
correlation between fiduciary duty and liability for failure to correct material
misrepresentations. The following section presents significant opinions
regarding this issue that collectively provide a foundation for potential future
Supreme Court review.
1.

Second Circuit: A Fiduciary Relationship is not Required for an
Actionable Section 10(b) claim

Prosecution under Section 10(b) has been limited to cases of nondisclosure
fraud involving breach of a fiduciary duty to the corporation, its shareholders,
or the source of the material nonpublic information. The O’Hagan decision
expanded Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability to corporate outsiders who owe
no fiduciary duty to the corporation or its shareholders because the Court elected
to base liability upon the fiduciary duty owed to the source of the material
information. 92 In SEC v. Dorozhko, the Second Circuit attempted to assuage
critics that insisted this overly restrictive version of misappropriation liability
frustrates the prosecution of defendants who trade on misappropriated
information acquired through other means by holding that the breach of a
fiduciary duty is not a required element of “deceptive device” for purposes of
liability under Section 10(b). 93
In October 2007, Defendant Oleksandr Dorozhko deposited $42,500 into an
online trading account with Interactive Brokers LLC. 94 Shortly after, IMS
Health, Inc. announced that it would release its third-quarter earnings during an
analyst conference call scheduled for 5PM on October 17, 2007, after the
securities markets in New York City closed. 95 Thomson Financial, Inc., an
investor relations and web-hosting firm, managed IMS Health’s earning report
release. 96 Beginning early in the morning on October 17, and continuing several
times during the morning and early afternoon, an anonymous computer hacker
attempted to gain access to the IMS earnings report by hacking into a secure

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 293–94.
United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 665–67 (1997).
574 F.3d 42, 49–50 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
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server at Thomson. 97 Minutes after Thomson actually received the IMS data, but
before the report’s official release, the hacker successfully located and
downloaded the IMS data from Thomson’s secure server. 98
Within an hour of the Thomson hack, Dorozhko—who had not previously
used his Interactive Brokers account to trade—purchased $41,670.90 worth of
IMS “put” options which represented approximately ninety percent of all put
option purchases for IMS stock in the previous six-week period. 99 In purchasing
these options, which the SEC describes as “extremely risky,” Dorozhko was
betting that IMS’s stock price would decline by greater than twenty percent
within a two-day expiration period. 100 Slightly before the scheduled analyst call,
IMS announced that its earnings per share were twenty-eight percent below
many Wall Street analysts’ expectations, and when the market opened the next
morning, October 18, IMS’s stock price sank as expected from $29.56 to $21.20
per share. 101 Within six minutes of the market opening, Dorozhko sold his IMS
options, realizing a $286,456.59 net profit overnight. 102
Interactive Brokers reported the irregular trading activity to the SEC, and
the SEC successfully sought a temporary restraining order preventing Dorozhko
from accessing the funds in his brokerage account. 103 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that computer hacking was not
“deceptive” within the meaning of Section 10(b) as defined by the Supreme
Court. 104 The District Court stated that “a breach of a fiduciary duty of disclosure
is a required element of any ‘deceptive’ device under section 10(b).” 105 Thus,
because Dorozhko was a corporate outsider with no special relationship to either
IMS Health shareholders or Thomson Financial, Dorozhko was not liable under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 without an accompanying breach of fiduciary
duty.
On appeal, the SEC maintained its theory that Dorozhko’s fraud was the
alleged computer hacking but urged the court to recognize the hacking as an
affirmative misrepresentation, which would not require breach of a fiduciary
duty to be fraudulent. 106 The Second Circuit noted that the SEC’s claim against
a corporate outsider, who owed no fiduciary duties to the source of the
information, was not based on either the classical or misappropriation theories

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 44–45 (2d Cir. 2009).
Id. at 45.
Id.
Id.
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of insider trading—the two generally accepted theories, 107 but accepted the
SEC’s argument and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine
whether computer hacking was “deceptive” or mere theft. 108
In holding that a fiduciary relationship was not required for computer
hacking to be “deceptive” under Section 10(b), the court distinguished
fraudulent nondisclosure from fraudulent misrepresentation. 109 The court
explained that previous Supreme Court decisions dealt only with cases of mere
nondisclosure which requires a breach of fiduciary duty, while the theory of
fraudulent misrepresentation does not. 110 In Chiarella, the Court held that the
defendant’s “silence,” or nondisclosure, was not fraud because he was under no
obligation to disclose his knowledge of inside information: “When an allegation
of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud absent a duty to
speak. We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere
possession of nonpublic market information.” 111 In O’Hagan, the government’s
liability theory centered on deception through nondisclosure, and the Court
determined that if the fiduciary discloses to the source that they plan to trade on
any nonpublic information, there is no “deceptive device,” and thus no federal
securities law violation under Section 10(b). 112 In SEC v. Zandford, the Court,
in a unanimous opinion, clarified that while not every common-law fraud that
involves securities is a violation of Section 10(b), it “should be construed not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.” 113
The District Court concluded that the Chiarella, O’Hagan, and Zandford
opinions explained any “deceptive device” requires a breach of fiduciary duty
and ruled that although the defendant may have broken the law, he was not liable
in a civil action under Section 10(b) because he owed no fiduciary duty either to
the information source or to those he transacted with in the market. 114 However,
on appeal, the Second Circuit determined that this interpretation was misguided,
and none of the opinions established fiduciary duty as a required element of
every Section 10(b) violation because the theory of fraud was only silence or
nondisclosure, not an affirmative misrepresentation—which is a “distinct
theory” of fraud. 115 Thus, although the Supreme Court in Chiarella, O’Hagan,
107. Id. The classical theory of insider trading involves a corporate insider trading in the
securities of his own corporation on the basis of material, non-public information; and the
misappropriation theory involves a person trading in knowing possession of material, non-public
information that has been gained in violation of a fiduciary duty to its source. Id.
108. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 45–46 (2d Cir. 2009).
109. Id. at 48.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 47 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980)).
112. Id. (citing United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654–55 (1997)).
113. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 47 (2d Cir. 2009) (citing Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002)).
114. Id. at 48.
115. Odian, supra note 24, at 1316, 1326, 1331.
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and Zandford held that remaining silent is actionable only where there is a duty
to speak arising from a fiduciary relationship, the Second Circuit stated these
cases all stood for the proposition that nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary
duty is sufficient for Section 10(b)’s “deceptive device” requirement but not
necessary. 116
Thus, the Dorozhko court held that although a fiduciary relationship is not a
required element for an actionable Section 10(b) securities claim, there is
nonetheless an affirmative obligation not to mislead in commercial dealings. The
Second Circuit took a step in the right direction.
2.

Third Circuit: High Corporate Executives

A reinvigorated approach to duty involves reliance and essentially says that
a person is not liable in a Rule 10b-5 lawsuit unless that person owes a duty of
honesty or candor to the victims of fraud. 117 How might that duty arise? In
United States v. Schiff, the Third Circuit refused to impose a general fiduciary
obligation on “high corporate executives” to the company’s shareholders. 118
Frederick Schiff and Richard Lane were executives at Bristol-Myers Squibb
charged with violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in a massive securities
fraud scheme related to Bristol’s wholesale pharmaceutical distribution channels
in the early 2000s. 119 The court dismissed the Government’s omission liability
theories under Rule 10b-5 that attempted to hold Schiff accountable for Lane’s
misstatements in Bristol’s quarterly conference calls. 120 As the relevant legal
grounding, Rule 10b-5(b) states in pertinent part: “It [is] unlawful . . . (b) [t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading[.]” 121 The court’s patience with the
Government’s “game of musical chairs” pursuing primary liability under Rule
10b-5 grew thin and regarded the Government’s legal theories as “designed to
find creative ways to hold Schiff and Lane liable for those SEC filings.” 122
Bristol is a public corporation and leading pharmaceutical manufacturer. 123
Schiff was promoted to Bristol’s Chief Financial Officer (“CFO”) in April

116. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Dorozhko, 574 F.3d 42, 48–49 (2d Cir. 2009).
117. Donald C. Langevoort, Reading Stoneridge Carefully: A Duty-Based Approach to
Reliance and Third-Party Liability Under Rule 10b-5, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2154 (2010).
118. See generally United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2010).
119. Id. at 155–56.
120. Id. at 156.
121. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
122. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 161.
123. Id. at 156.
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2001, 124 and later left the company mid-April 2002. 125 As CFO, the SEC filings
were Schiff’s primary responsibility. 126 Lane was the president of Bristol’s
Worldwide Medicines Group, and left the company in early-April 2002. 127 Both
Schiff and Lane represented Bristol on quarterly public conference calls with
Wall Street analysts. 128 From 2000 through 2001, Bristol implemented the sales
strategy that was the subject of this litigation. 129
Bristol primarily uses wholesalers to sell and distribute its pharmaceutical
products to supply pharmacies, hospitals, and other health care providers; the
wholesalers buy and maintain an inventory based on a projected customer
demand for the products, known as a “prescription demand.” 130 Wholesalers
generally try to target their purchases to the prescription demand because more
inventory results in higher carrying costs and, when wholesalers purchase in
excess of demand, it reduces Bristol’s later sales as the wholesalers must “work
down” excess inventory to normal demand levels before purchasing more
product. 131 For the new sales strategy, Bristol gave its wholesalers financial
incentives to buy products exceeding prescription demand projections. 132 For
example, in August 2001, Schiff and Lane approved $47 million in sales
incentives for the third quarter, and in November 2001, Lane approved $85
million in sales incentives for the fourth quarter. 133 These incentives allegedly
covered the wholesalers’ carrying costs and guaranteed return on their
investment until they sold the products. 134 The Government characterized this
“channel stuffing scheme” as a deceptive strategy. 135
124. “The CFO of a publicly traded corporation is entrusted with control of the firm’s financial
reporting and public disclosure and is required by federal law to disclose to the firm’s auditors and
audit committee any fraud that involves management or other employees who have a significant
role in the issuer’s internal controls.” Craig Ehrlich, When Minding Your Own Business Means
Speaking Up: Criminally Punishing a Corporate Executive for Failing to Blow the Whistle on the
Illegal Misconduct of a Colleague, 32 J.L. & COM. 255, 257 (2014).
125. United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2010).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. Public companies often schedule conference calls to discuss their earnings or share
other information with investors.
129. Id.
130. United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 2010).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 156–57.
135. United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 156–57 (3d Cir. 2010). A channel stuffing scheme
involves temporarily increasing the corporation’s apparent revenues by selling excess inventory to
distributors who neither needed nor wanted it, and paying them to accept it. The corporation uses
channel stuffing near the end of each quarter in order to give the appearance that it is meeting its
revenue targets. What is channel stuffing?, CFI, https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/
knowledge/strategy/channel-stuffing/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
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During several quarterly conference calls with stock analysts, Schiff
remained silent although he knew that Lane made material misrepresentations
concerning the corporation’s financial statements. 136 The Government alleged
that Schiff and Lane used the analyst calls to conceal these practices from
shareholders and potential investors by making “materially false and misleading
statements and omissions of material fact” during the analyst calls, press
releases, and meetings with investors. 137 Upon disclosure of the scheme months
later, the corporation’s stock price quickly fell twenty-five percent, providing
evidence of the material information misrepresented by Lane and suggesting that
the fraud could have been nipped in the bud but for Schiff’s silence, which
allowed it to grow and the resulting damage to multiply. 138
Absent a duty to disclose, silence is not fraudulent or misleading under Rule
10b-5 because a company has no general duty to provide the public with all
material information, however when discussing material information, one is
bound to speak truthfully. 139 Thus, if Schiff owed a fiduciary duty to Bristol’s
shareholders to correct any statements by Lane on the analyst calls, then Schiff’s
failure to correct those statements in subsequent SEC filings would be actionable
under Rule 10b-5. The District Court concluded, and the Third Circuit agreed,
that prior precedent, Oran v. Stafford, determined that a duty to disclose under
Rule 10b-5 may only arise in three circumstances: (1) insider trading, (2) a
statute requiring disclosure, or (3) an inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading prior
disclosure. 140 However, the Government suggested that Oran did not create an
136. Schiff, 602 F.3d at 169 n.22.
137. Id. at 157. The government supplied four pertinent actionable statements, each made while
both Schiff and Lane were on the calls in 2001. On April 25, in the first quarter, Schiff stated, “We
look at, very closely, the wholesaler stocking inventories. . . . [T]here are no unusual items that we
see in the inventory levels.” Id. On July 25, in the second quarter, Schiff stated, “[W]e don’t see
anything unusual” in the “wholesaler inventories,” and Lane, later on the same call, responded “no”
when asked whether there were inventory issues. Id. On October 23, in the third quarter, Schiff
stated that inventory was “up a couple of weeks” and expected “to be lower in the fourth quarter.”
Id. And finally, on December 13, which is outside of the quarterly call cycle, Schiff stated, “We
don’t see any significant changes” in the prior call’s statements that “inventory levels are slightly
higher” and “would be reduced by the end of the year.” Id. Lane was allegedly involved in the
analyst calls dating back to 2000, and Schiff participated in the calls after his promotion to CFO.
Id.
138. Id.
139. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
140. See Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275, 286 (3d Cir. 2000). Oran was a civil class action
brought by investors against a pharmaceutical company for alleged misrepresentations and
omissions regarding connection between the company’s weight loss medications and information
related to heart valve problems of patients using those drugs. Id. at 279. Among other things, the
plaintiffs argued that the company’s failure to disclose the dates on which it first learned of adverse
data and reports was a material omission because of the light it would have cast on the company’s
potential liability exposure. Id. at 285. The Oran Court concluded that none of the three
circumstances to create a duty under Rule 10b-5 were present, and thus there was no duty to disclose

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2021]

THE DUTY TO CORRECT ANOTHER’S MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS

185

exhaustive list, and there is a fourth circumstance in which Schiff’s duty to
disclose in the SEC filings arose: a general fiduciary obligation of “high
corporate executives” to the company’s shareholders. 141
The court criticized the Government’s generalized corporate fiduciary duty
theory as vague and having few logical boundaries, questioning what the
limiting principle would be if this duty were imposed on corporations and its
employees. 142 Next, the court turned to Schiff’s brief that discussed whether a
fiduciary would owe shareholders a duty “to rectify” public misstatements of
others when they are made, for example, on a conference call or in a written
report or on the internet, and whether it mattered who made the statements, such
as a coworker or news reporter, or how the fiduciary discovered the
discrepancy. 143 The Third Circuit was unwilling to create a fiduciary obligation
to rectify others’ statements when it simply “gilds the lily” because there are
other plausible theories to hold these individuals criminally liable for their
statements and omissions. 144
The court further argued that Section 10(b)’s plain language and
corresponding Rule 10b-5 do not contemplate the general failure to rectify
another’s misstatements. 145 The Rule’s plain language presents two bases for
liability: (1) “[t]o make any untrue statement” or (2) “to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not misleading.” 146 The
court supported this idea that the plain language allows for two specific bases
for liability by referencing In re Burlington Coat Factory Securities Litigation,
“a Section 10(b) plaintiff ordinarily is required to identify a specific statement
made by the company and then explain either (1) how the statement was
materially misleading or (2) how it omitted a fact that made the statement

the information. Id. at 286. The First Circuit also follows this precedent. See Roeder v. Alpha
Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987).
141. United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 162–63 (3d Cir. 2010). The Government cited to
language in Winer Family Trust v. Queen to support their argument that the Third Circuit’s prior
opinions did not intend exclusivity: “As a general matter, an affirmative duty arises only when there
is insider trading, a statute requiring disclosure, or an inaccurate, incomplete, or misleading
disclosure.” Id. at 163 (citing Winer Family Trust v. Queen, 503 F.3d 319, 329 (3d Cir. 2007)). The
court explained that the “general matter” phrase was an introduction to the discussion of why the
defendants had no disclosure duty and signaled to the use of “only.” Id.
142. Id. at 164.
143. Id. at 165. The court zeroed in on its vagueness argument with several questions,
“Moreover, for how long would this duty attach such that rectification would be required for an
officer to absolve himself of this fiduciary liability? Would it be limited to the same day, a week, a
month, or even one year? Would this duty potentially rope in all corporate officers based on a single
misstatement by another individual, such that a case could be brought against all executives in a
particular company under this theory?” Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 167.
146. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
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materially misleading.” 147 Thus, the court agreed with Schiff’s argument that the
Government’s contention that he “actually made the omissions” by not
rectifying Lane’s purported misstatements conflates the two independent
grounds, denying the Government’s contention that securities law should be
interpreted broadly. 148
Corporate officers and directors are fiduciaries to the issuer and its
shareholders, and this relationship has long been recognized to include a duty of
candor. 149 This should suffice to create the requisite duty to correct another
executive’s misrepresentations of their corporation’s financial situation.
3.

Ninth Circuit: The Flexible Duty Test

In Paracor, the Ninth Circuit used a flexible duty test to determine the
presence of a fiduciary-type relationship prescribed by Chiarella. 150 At the
bottom, the court’s multifactor analysis asked whether the circumstances were
such that the counterparty expected certain information, if possessed by the other
side, would be disclosed. 151 But, in light of Chiarella’s insistence that a
fiduciary-type relationship is necessary, its connotation is unclear: does the
Ninth Circuit’s approach operate as an independent source of the duty to
disclose, or is it only applicable as a means to determine whether a fiduciarytype relationship exists?
Jordan Schnitzer, a Portland businessman, purchased Casablanca Industries,
Inc., a California ceiling fan manufacturer, in a leveraged buyout. 152 In April
1989, General Electric Capital Corp. agreed to provide a $53 million bridge loan
to finance Casablanca Acquisition Corp. with the condition that the Casablanca
would immediately sell $27 million in high-yield subordinated debentures, or
“junk bonds,” to pay down the loan. 153
In March 1989, Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. prepared a Private
Placement Memorandum for Schnitzer that contained various representations
about Casablanca, including sales projections of $83.3 million and earnings of
$8.5 million for fiscal year 1989, and distributed it to various institutional
147. United States v. Schiff, 602 F.3d 152, 167 (3d Cir. 2010).
148. Id. at 168.
149. In the field of corporate law, the duty of candor refers to a fiduciary duty of a company’s
executives and board members to disclose all the material information required for evaluating the
company to its shareholders. Jason Gordon, Duty of Candor – Definition, BUS. PROF. (updated Dec.
16, 2020), https://thebusinessprofessor.com/lesson/duty-of-candor-explained/#:~:text=In%20the
%20field%20of%20corporate,its%20management%2C%20to%20its%20shareholders.
150. Paracor Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996).
151. Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1671.
152. Paracor, 96 F.3d at 1155. Schnitzer hired Bear, Stearns & Co. to locate a profitable
corporation which he could purchase and merge with an unprofitable corporation he owned in order
to utilize his corporation’s net operating loss carryforwards and obtain certain tax benefits—a
leveraged buyout. Id. at 1154–55.
153. Id. The bridge financing would later be replaced with permanent financing by GE Capital.
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investors active in the subordinated debt market. 154 By early May, the Investors,
Paracor Finance, Inc., 155 Cargill Financial Services Corp., Lutheran
Brotherhood, and Farm Bureau Life Insurance Co., decided to purchase the
debentures after inspecting Casablanca’s books, meeting with its management,
visiting Casablanca’s offices, and occasionally contacting GE Capital. 156
By June, Schnitzer successfully completed his tender offer and merged with
Casablanca, but Casablanca’s fortunes were already declining. 157 Casablanca’s
April sales were only $7.88 million, compared with the $10.195 million
projections, and May and June sales were also below projections. 158 During this
time, Burton was Casablanca’s CEO, and Jerry Holland was the President. 159
The Debenture Purchase Agreement negotiated between the Investors and
Casablanca represented that “[s]ince March 31, 1989, Casablanca has not
suffered any Material Adverse Effect[,]” and the Investors represented that they
“had access to the information [they] requested from [Casablanca]” and that they
“made [their] own investment decision with respect to the purchase of the
Debentures . . . without relying on any other Person.” 160 Casablanca defaulted
after its first interest payment on the debentures and filed for bankruptcy a year
later. 161 In March 1991, the Investors filed suit against Casablanca, GE Capital,
and Schnitzer, Burton, and Holland, claiming, as relevant to this Note, primary
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations. 162
On appeal, the Investors asserted that GE Capital and Burton were primarily
liable under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for making affirmative
misrepresentations and failing to disclose material facts about Casablanca’s
sales because they were not provided with the negative sales data from the three
months immediately prior to the acquisition. 163 The heart of the Investors’ Rule
10b-5 claim was that GE Capital knew about Casablanca’s poor April–June
quarter sales results and failed to disclose them. 164 However, Rule 10b-5 is
violated by nondisclosure only when there is a duty to disclose. Like the Second
Circuit, the Ninth Circuit cited Chiarella to explain that parties to an impersonal
market transaction owe no duty of disclosure absent a fiduciary relationship,
prior dealings, or circumstances such that one party has placed trust and

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Previously Elders Finance, Inc.
Paracor Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Paracor Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 1156–57.
Id. at 1157.
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confidence in the other. 165 The Ninth Circuit then presented factors to determine
whether a party has a duty to disclose: (1) the relationship of the parties; (2) their
relative access to information; (3) the benefit that the defendant derives from the
relationship; (4) the defendant’s awareness that the plaintiff was relying upon
the relationship in making the investment decision; and (5) the defendant’s
activity in initiating the transaction. 166
Taken together, the court determined that these factors show GE Capital
initiated a financial transaction from which it stood to benefit, but not that GE
Capital assumed a relationship of trust and confidence with the Investors. 167
Nonetheless, the Ninth Circuit’s factor test remains useful, but requires
additional clarification.
III. POTENTIAL SUPREME COURT INTERPRETATION & ANALYSIS OF IMPACT
Fraud is among the most costly, stigmatizing, and punitive forms of liability
enforced against actors in modern corporations and financial markets. 168 Thus,
when the law of securities fraud fails to generate judicial instruction on who
deserves blame and why, it wastes a valuable resource. 169 The SEC is a massive
sanctioning machine, but it cannot be mobilized without commitment from the
legal system, which would undermine the purpose of securities laws and the
165. Id. (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980)).
166. Paracor Fin. v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996).
167. Upon application of these factors, the Court determined that the relationship between GE
Capital and the Investors did not rise to the level at which GE Capital assumed a duty to disclose.
First, GE Capital had no relationship with the Investors prior to the debenture transaction. In fact,
it had no contact whatsoever with Lutheran Brotherhood and Farm Bureau Life Insurance, and its
contact with the other two investors amounted to a couple of brief face-to-face meetings and a
handful of telephone calls. Second, the Investors’ access to information was comparable to GE
Capital’s because Casablanca was required to provide daily “Open Sales Order” reports and other
weekly reports. Although the Investors did not receive these reports, they are “sophisticated
institutions with competent analysts” that conducted their own due diligence and signed
representations that they were provided with all information that they requested. Third, GE Capital
certainly benefitted from the Investors’ purchase of the debentures by having their exposure on the
$53 million unsecured bridge loan effectively reduced. Fourth, GE Capital informed Cargill
Financial Services and Elders Finance on more than one occasion and in writing that they could not
rely on GE Capital, so when GE Capital provided Elders Finance with a copy of its business survey
of Casablanca, it insisted that Elders Finance state in writing that it was not relying on GE Capital.
Finally, GE Capital effectively initiated the debenture transaction because its bridge loan to
Schnitzer was conditioned on the debenture offering being made. “[I]n a one-shot deal with GE
Capital’s participation,” the Investors were expected to do their own due diligence and were
carefully warned not to rely on the information GE Capital shared with them. In sum, the Court
held that GE Capital cannot be held liable for its alleged omissions because it never had a duty to
disclose to the Investors in the first place, and without actionable misrepresentations or omissions,
the Investors’ claim cannot be pursued. Id. at 1157–58.
168. Samuel W. Buell, What is Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 521 (2011).
169. Id. at 519.
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public interest it aims to serve. 170 The SEC needs judicial support to enforce
disclosure, improve accuracy in disclosure, and deter fraudulent behavior. 171
A.

The Circuit Critique

Whether a court can find a basis in existing law to impose a duty to speak
upon someone who has merely witnessed another make a material
misrepresentation is a policy question. 172 There is already one person, the
speaker of the misrepresentation, who is easily subject to prosecution, and in
America, it is not criminally punishable to look the other way when one
witnesses a legal violation as it evokes thoughts of a surveillance state where
citizens must condemn each other. 173 Nevertheless, while there are persuasive
arguments against punishing silence, the SEC’s unique role in encouraging
honest capital to benefit businesses, individual consumers, and the economy as
a whole justifies judicial recognition of an appropriate framework for the circuits
to resolve duty questions when fraudulent behavior violates Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5—the SEC’s “catchall” regulation to prevent fraudulent practices
within the securities markets.
The Second Circuit’s interpretation of prior Supreme Court rulings is
instructive: nondisclosure in breach of a fiduciary duty is sufficient for Section
10(b)’s “deceptive device” requirement but not necessary. By removing the
fiduciary relationship requirement from an actionable Section 10(b) claim, the
Second Circuit reiterated the affirmative obligation not to mislead in commercial
dealings while also expanding the SEC’s ability to hold individuals accountable
for fraudulent behavior. While the fiduciary relationship requirement reflects the
principle that mere possession of nonpublic information does not trigger a duty
to disclose, removing the requirement does not undercut federal securities laws’
disapproval of the inappropriate and deceptive use of special relationships.
Rather, the removal supports the SEC’s intention that Section 10(b) is to act as
a “catchall” clause to prevent fraudulent practices within the securities markets
by additionally holding those that misrepresented material information to
another’s demise accountable. Basically, it removes a loophole without
removing an analytical consideration.
Further, the Second Circuit’s categorization that affirmative representations
are a distinct species of fraud supports the significance between the “deceptive
device” requirement in nondisclosure versus misrepresentation cases. 174 The

170. Id. at 517.
171. See id. at 581.
172. Ehrlich, supra note 124, at 257.
173. Id. at 258.
174. This idea is also supported by scholars: “By far, insider trading and issuer disclosure
questions dominate the law relating to the affirmative duty to disclose. Our suggestion is that they
represent two distinct fields of inquiry, with unique interests at stake, so that precedent and dicta
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“deceptive device” requirement in a nondisclosure case is the trader’s breach of
fiduciary duty to the source of the nonpublic information they fraudulently used,
whereas the “deceptive device” requirement in affirmative misrepresentation
cases is the fraudulent material misrepresentation of facts to induce another to
trade. In both scenarios, there is reliance on the source of information, but the
difference is how the fraudulent use of information presents liability.
While the Second Circuit took a step forward, the Third Circuit took a step
back. The Third Circuit’s criticism of a “high corporate executive” general
fiduciary obligation as vague and illogical is ironic. The unique role played by a
corporate executive deserves judicial acknowledgement of an affirmative duty
to respond to misrepresentations by other corporate officers concerning the
corporation’s financial statement. 175 Schiff was not an “accidental passerby” but
the CFO of a publicly traded corporation—the company’s financial “high priest
of integrity.” 176 In this capacity, the executive board members and the
stockholders who rely on Schiff have a reasonable expectation that he will be
intolerant of deception, and thus the absolution of legal liability subsequent to
his deliberate indifference to Lane’s fraudulent statements goes too far. 177
Notably, the Third Circuit’s reasoning is in direct contradiction with the
SEC’s intention that Section 10(b) is to act as a “catchall” clause to prevent
fraudulent practices within the securities markets. The Rule’s plain language
presents two bases for liability: (1) “[t]o make any untrue statement” or (2) “to
omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements . . . not
misleading.” 178 Schiff undoubtedly “omit[ted] to state [the] material fact[s]
necessary” to make Lane’s statements not misleading by remaining silent on the
analyst calls. 179 The Schiff court’s In re Burlington interpretation is misguided
because the Supreme Court has clarified that Section 10(b) “should be construed
not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.” 180 Thus, while In re Burlington demonstrates pleading requirements
for plaintiffs “to identify a specific statement . . . and then explain either (1) how
the statement was materially misleading or (2) how it omitted a fact that made
the statement materially misleading,” 181 it does not support a finding that Section
10(b)’s plain language and corresponding Rule 10b-5 do not contemplate the
general failure to rectify another’s misstatements.

developed within each should not automatically be applied to other kinds of duty questions.”
Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1681.
175. Ehrlich, supra note 124, at 258.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b).
179. Id.
180. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
181. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1430 (3d Cir. 1997).
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Rule 10b-5(b) declares it unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to
make any untrue statement of a material fact. 182 Roughly one year after Schiff,
the Supreme Court decided Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative
Traders, which turned on the meaning of the verb “to make” within the rule. 183
The Court held that only the maker of the statement can be held liable in a private
action under Rule 10b-5(b) for material misstatements, and even one who
prepares a statement on another’s behalf is not its maker. 184 The Janus Court
held that the maker of a statement is “the entity with authority over the content
of the statement and whether and how to communicate it. Without such
authority, it is not ‘necessary or inevitable’ that any falsehood will be contained
in the statement.” 185 Janus was recently overturned by the Lorenzo decision, 186
but the Court’s reasoning provides for discussion: Could Schiff be regarded as
the maker of the misleading statements under Rule 10b-5 since Schiff, as CFO,
was entrusted with control of the firm’s financial reporting and public disclosure,
and thus, a plausible case could be made that he had ultimate authority regarding
the statement made by Lane? 187
Further, other areas of the law require those who have assumed a greater
responsibility to report witnessed wrongdoing and to act for the protection of
others: most states have laws that require mental health professionals to disclose
information about patients who may become violent; 188 some states require auto
repair garages to notify police when cars show evidence of having been in an
accident or bullet holes; 189 and lawyers must inform the appropriate professional
authorities when they have knowledge that another lawyer violated the Rules of
Professional Conduct. 190 These duties apply to specific groups of people
expected to come across certain circumstances by the nature of their professional
knowledge, and the scope of their duty is limited to such. 191 It follows that
professional status and expertise in the financial world creates an expectation
that the person or entity appreciates the regulatory constraints in place to reduce
the economic harm that flows from the spread of misinformation in the
investment marketplace. 192 This supports a finding that high corporate
182. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
183. Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 142 (2011).
184. Id. at 144.
185. Id.
186. See Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 1099 (2019).
187. See Ehrlich, supra note 124, at 314.
188. Mental Health Professionals’ Duty to Warn, 50 State Table, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGIS.
(Jan. 2013), available at http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/mental-health-professionalsduty-to-warn.aspx.
189. Gabriel D.M. Ciociola, Misprision of Felony and Its Progeny, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 697,
730–31 (2003).
190. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 8.3(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005).
191. See generally Ehrlich, supra note 124.
192. Langevoort, supra note 117, at 2154–55.
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executives have a duty to correct material misrepresentations regarding their
corporation’s financial circumstances as suggested by the Government in Schiff.
While the Government cabined this duty by characterizing it as only
requiring “high corporate officers” to rectify misstatements, the Third Circuit
continued to push back and questioned what the limiting principle would be if
this duty were imposed on corporations and its employees. 193 The Ninth
Circuit’s flexible duty test provides an elegant solution. In fact, some scholars
characterize the courts’ reluctance to use a version of the Ninth Circuit’s flexible
duty as an “unfortunate oversight.” 194 However, rather than using the flexible
duty test to determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists, the ideologies of
securities regulation are better served by using the factors as an independent
source of the duty to disclose, which in turn abandons some of Chiarella’s
reasoning.
According to Chiarella’s dicta, the duty to disclose is central and arises only
when there is a pre-existing fiduciary relationship between the parties. Read in
context, this suggested an appropriate solution to the insider trading problem in
a world where informational imbalances thrive and markets reward hasty
information discovery. 195 The Court chose to impose the fiduciary principle
because it is easily delineated, unlike overbroad fairness standards. 196 Thus, in
the context of insider trading, the bright-line rule that those with a fiduciary duty
must put their interests second to those to whom they owe that duty may be
appropriate, but it remains confusing in other Rule 10b-5 contexts that involve
a variety of interests. Similarly, the O’Hagan decision was highly criticized
because one clear implication is that a trader in O’Hagan’s position could avoid
10b-5 liability by notifying their information source of an intent to trade on its
information. 197 But the O’Hagan rule is not actually meant to produce disclosure
to the source because no employee is going to disclose to their boss that they are
planning to steal from them. 198 However, the underlying ideology of both
opinions can be served by a contextual approach for analyzing violations of Rule
10b-5.
B.

The Contextual Approach for Analyzing Violations of Rule 10b-5

The most expansive conception of fraud would cover both statements and
omissions, encompass all deceiving and misleading acts—including negligence,
impose more demanding disclosure obligations—especially on those involved

193. Id. at 2156.
194. Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1686.
195. Id. at 1675.
196. Id.
197. Donna M. Nagy, Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A
Post-O’Hagan Suggestion, 59 OHIO STATE L.J. 1223, 1256 (1998).
198. Id. at 1257.
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in special relationships, permit all forms of civil and criminal sanctioning,
extend to economic and noneconomic interest deprivations, and apply to public
and political interactions between private individuals and the government. 199
While that is ideal in theory, it is not as simple in practice. Yet, a future Supreme
Court ruling that incorporates the ruling from Dorozhko, reconsiders the
government’s theory in Schiff, and clarifies how to apply the flexible duty test
from Paracor is closer to the goal.
Prior to the Paracor decision, an Eighth Circuit case, Arthur Young & Co.
v. Reves, also applied a flexible duty test to determine whether accountants had
a duty to disclose to investors a fuller picture regarding a cooperative’s
fortunes. 200 Reves involved an Arkansas cooperative that issued notes to a large
number of investors, and when the investment turned south, the disgruntled
investors sued the accountants. 201 The court applied the flexible duty test and
found that a duty had indeed been violated even though there was no pre-existing
relationship between the accountants and investors. 202 The court assessed the
transactional context in which the accountants were silent 203 and found that the
overall picture suggested the accountants’ silence was misleading. 204
This flexible duty test should function as a case-by-case, contextual analysis,
which recognizes prior Supreme Court precedent and further serves the SEC’s
intent to boost market integrity. Consequently, the courts must consider, as in
Reves, whether the company, law firm, or accountants involved have created a
reasonable expectation of disclosure, 205 rather than whether a fiduciary
relationship exists. This approach is easily implemented because the current
analytical approach is fact-intensive, 206 and it would help mitigate the courts’
reluctance to create additional information disclosure obligations for companies.
Further, this approach should account for the principles of scienter and the
business judgement rule to create logical boundaries that alleviate the Third
Circuit’s fears in Schiff. As to scienter, creative involvement with a scheme to
defraud implies a duty because those schemes require planning and cleverness
to avoid detection. 207 This boundary is further supported by the Supreme Court’s
199. Buell, supra note 168, at 524.
200. Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1329 (8th Cir. 1991), aff’d sub nom. Reves
v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
201. Id. at 1321.
202. Id. at 1330–31.
203. Among the factors that appeared to be important to the court were the facts that the
investors were farmers in Arkansas, the prominent accountants had made multiple appearances at
the cooperative’s meeting, and the accountants were fully aware of the cooperative’s problems, but
said nothing to warn the investors. Id.
204. Id. at 1331.
205. Langevoort & Gulati, The Muddled Duty, supra note 35, at 1674.
206. Gomez-Arostegui, supra note 42, at 1414. (“Whether a misstatement or misleading
omission has occurred is typically a question of fact.”).
207. Langevoort, supra note 117, at 2155.
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ruling in Hochfelder that recommended a subjective standard for measuring
whether a misrepresentation is intentional, willful, or knowing. 208 Under the
business judgement rule, courts are reluctant to substitute their judgment for the
board of directors’ unless the board’s decisions are unreasonable. The rationale
is that corporate executives enjoy the benefit of a presumption that their
decisions were made in good faith and designed to promote their corporation’s
best interests. 209 Courts focus on how a board of directors makes a decision
rather than whether the decision was correct. 210 The logic is that corporate
executives understand their corporation’s financial situations and the
consequences of their decisions better than the judges hearing the case. 211 In
combining these principles, courts can balance an executive’s active
engagement in creating a deception with the professional’s expertise in the
financial world to determine if there is, subjectively, evidence of fraud. This is
further supported and restricted by Santa Fe’s dicta requiring more than a
garden-variety state fiduciary claim because mere instances of corporate
mismanagement resulting in unfair shareholder treatment by a fiduciary are not
a violation of Rule 10b-5. 212
The current framework suggests three issues to determine when a duty to
disclose arises: (1) whether a fiduciary relationship exists; (2) under what
circumstances that relationship gives rise to an affirmative disclosure duty; and
(3) when a breach of that duty is fraudulent for purposes of Rule 10b-5. 213 The
contextual approach removes the fiduciary relationship requirement from an
actionable securities claim under Section 10(b), but the analysis still begins with
determining whether a fiduciary relationship exists between the accused
individuals and the source of the information or the corporation that was harmed.
If there is a fiduciary relationship, the analysis expands the second step of the
current framework to subjectively assess what role that individual plays within
208. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976). Further, the scienter element
alleviates the Schiff court’s fear that the failure “to rectify” public misstatements of news reporters
on the internet presents liability. The scienter element redirects the courts to focus on the intent
behind the scheme to defraud a corporation, not the spread of misinformation itself. Additionally,
a company would likely respond to any misinformation in the news. For example, the GameStop,
Reddit, and Robinhood CEOs each responded to the GameStop investment frenzy. See Robinhood
CEO Delivers Opening Statement and Apologizes to Customers During GameStop Hearing, CNBC
(Feb. 18, 2021, 12:30 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2021/02/18/robinhood-ceo-delivers-open
ing-statement-and-apologizes-to-customers-during-gamestop-hearing.html.
209. See Kamin v. Am. Express Co., 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 812 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), aff’d, 387
N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968) (quoting Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 142 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928)).
210. Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 780.
211. Id. at 779, 780.
212. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977).
213. See Lorenzo v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 139 S. Ct. 1094 (2019); Rosenblum, supra note
26, at 293–94.
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the corporation and the requisite scienter analysis. The Ninth Circuit’s factors
are helpful, but not exhaustive: (1) the relationship between the parties; (2) their
relative access to information; (3) the benefit that the defendant derives from the
relationship; (4) the defendant’s awareness that the plaintiff was relying upon
the relationship in making the investment decision; and (5) the defendant’s
activity in initiating the transaction. 214
Most importantly, the contextual approach considers the specific facts of the
case at hand—analyzing the specific set of individuals, the specific
circumstances that led to the violation, and the nature of their specific
professional knowledge to determine the scope of an individual’s duty. Per the
Lorenzo Court, Congress could not have intended for those who engage in
“plainly fraudulent” behavior to escape primary liability under Rule 10b-5. 215
Rather, the Supreme Court routinely observes Congress’s intent that Section
10(b) is to act as a “catchall” clause to prevent fraudulent practices within the
securities markets. 216 Consequently, the contextual analysis provides a
“catchall” approach to resolving Rule 10b-5 violation claims and preventing
fraudulent behavior from slipping through the cracks.
CONCLUSION
In promulgating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, Congress, and the SEC by
way of Congressional authority, designed these laws to encompass the infinite
variety of devices by which undue advantage could be taken of investors and
corporations. 217 Another goal of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is the need to
protect the security market’s integrity from abuses by those with access to
material nonpublic information that would affect the price of a corporation’s
securities upon public disclosure. 218 As the GameStop scenario plainly suggests,
individuals are capable of finding creative ways to manipulate the market, and
in turn, courts must also be creative in holding those individuals accountable for
their fraudulent behavior.

214. Paracor Finance v. General Electric Capital Corp., 96 F.3d 1151, 1157 (9th Cir. 1996).
215. Id. at 1097. Justices Thomas and Gorsuch warned in dissent that the Court’s opinion could
mean “virtually any person who assists with the making of a fraudulent misstatement will be
primarily liable and thereby subject not only to SEC enforcement, but private lawsuits.” Id. at 1110
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
216. See Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 472; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819
(2002); Dirks v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 653 n.10 (1983); United States v. O’Hagan,
521 U.S. 642, 657 (1997); Chiarella v. United States., 445 U.S. 222, 246 (1980) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–03 (1976).
217. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 6668, 1961 WL 60638 (Nov. 8,
1961).
218. Final Rule: Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154,
2000 WL 1201556 (Aug. 15, 2000).
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The diversity of circuit opinions demonstrates that any given Rule 10b-5
claim is unique and rarely allows for a single coherent answer. Thus, the
Supreme Court should adopt a case-by-case, contextual approach for analyzing
Rule 10b-5 violations. Notably, this approach (1) incorporates the Second
Circuit’s rule from Dorozhko that a fiduciary relationship is not a required
element for an actionable securities claim under Section 10(b), but there is
nonetheless an affirmative obligation not to mislead in commercial dealings; (2)
corrects the Third Circuit’s oversight of the Government’s “high corporate
executive” theory from Schiff; and (3) clarifies the purpose of the Ninth Circuit’s
flexible duty test from Paracor. Because the securities market is the backbone
of our American commercial system, integrity of the market is essential—and
conduct that threatens market integrity should therefore violate Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 219
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